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PAMELA R. METZGER

Fear of Adversariness: Using Gideon To Restrict

Defendants' Invocation of Adversary Procedures
ABSTRACT. Fifty years ago Gideon promised that an attorney would vindicate the
constitutional rights of any accused too poor to afford an attorney. But Gideon also promised
more. Writ small, Gideon promised to protect individual defendants; writ large, Gideon promised
to protect our system of constitutional criminal procedure. Much has been written about
Gideon's broken promise to our poor; this Essay is about Gideon's broken promise to our system.
With its army of zealous public defenders, Gideon should have produced litigation that
vigorously protected the core structures of our adversary trial system. Instead, courts have
converted Gideon representation into a Gideon defendant's defacto relinquishment of important
Sixth Amendment rights. As a result, counsel - not client - controls the invocation and exercise
of the adversary procedures. And, even as to those Sixth Amendment rights still within a
defendant's exclusive control, Strickland eviscerates a defendant's capacity to seek redress when
counsel precludes the exercise of a fundamental right. As a result, Gideon has increasingly
become an enforcer of the status quo - a cog in the systemic machine that grinds continually
toward under-enforcement of Sixth Amendment adversary rights.
A U T H O R. Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research support of Tulane Law School. The author also wishes to thank
Professors Jancy Hoeffel, Joe Thorp, and. Keith Werhan for their extraordinary assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago Gideon v. Wainwright promised that an attorney would
vindicate the constitutional rights of any accused too poor to afford one.' But
Gideon also promised more; Gideon promised to promote our adversarial
system of constitutional criminal procedure.
The vitality of our adversarial system of constitutional criminal procedure
"depends for its enforcement on criminal defense counsel," 2 the vast majority
of whom are appointed under Gideon's mandate. Criminal defendants and their
attorneys act as the "attorneys general of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments," 3 and the guarantees of those Amendments can only be realized
through "an adequate level of litigation by defendants, meaning in practice by
defense counsel." 4 With an army of zealous public defenders, and an increasing
recognition of the right to effective assistance of counsel, Gideon should have
invigorated and sustained the adversarial core of our criminal justice system.
Instead, our criminal justice system has become largely a system of
settlement-not adversarial contest. And, even in those cases that proceed to
trial, defendants have fewer and fewer opportunities to demand the full range
of adversarial criminal procedures promised by the Constitution.
There are many reasons why Gideon failed to invigorate the adversarial
system. Among them, I contend, is the Court's deep-seated fear-of Gideon and
of the full adversariness Gideon could bring to the criminal justice system.
There are many ways that the Court has responded to this fear, but one is
particularly tragic: it has used Gideon to cabin and restrict the full adversariness
promised by the Sixth Amendment.
My focus in this Essay is on how the Supreme Court has used Gideon to
decrease the protection of Sixth Amendment rights that constitute the core
structures of the American adjudicatory process. When read as a restriction of
defendant-directed adversariness, Gideon erodes the underlying architecture of
American criminal procedure.
I.

THE REGULATION OF DEFENDANT-DRIVEN

ADVERSARINESS

THROUGH GIDEON AND STRICKLAND

In this Essay, I argue that the Supreme Court is deeply afraid of the Sixth

1.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

2.

William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between CriminalProcedure and CriminalJustice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1997).

3.

Stuntz, supra note 2, at 20.

4.

Id. at 12.
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Amendment's true power. If "constitutional criminal procedure defines what
the criminal process looks like, but is agnostic about how much of that process
the system should have,"5 the same cannot be said of the American judiciary.6
After all, imagine the consequences if a modern army of criminal defendants
insisted upon the full exercise of their Sixth Amendment rights: no plea
bargains; no stipulations to the admissibility of evidence, including to witness
testimony; no waivers of cross-examination; and full presentation of all
available defense witnesses. The Court's fear of Sixth Amendment
adversariness is most apparent in its careful protection of plea bargaining; it is
most hypocritical in the Court's deliberate effort to use Gideon to justify rules
that make the ever-dwindling number of trials move more efficiently-and less
adversarially- toward a verdict.
A. The Court's General Preferencefor NonadversarialCase Resolution
Shortly after announcing Gideon's unfunded mandate, the Court began to
regulate both guilty pleas generally7 and guilty pleas obtained through plea
bargaining.! Gideon informed the Court's willingness to endorse plea
bargaining.' At that time, at least three-quarters of all criminal convictions
resulted from guilty pleas, and the Court felt compelled to both recognize the
criminal justice system's dependence upon guilty pleas, particularly those
obtained through plea bargaining,' and to regulate the administration of those
plea bargains." Plea bargains were not merely "important components of this
country's criminal justice system";" they were "essential" and "highly desirable

5.

Stuntz, supra note 2, at 22.

6.

See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in CriminalCases, a National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1074 (2006) (describing how judges encourage plea bargaining
as a way of disposing of lengthy dockets); see also Richard Klein, Due Process Denied:Judicial
Coercion in the Plea BargainingProcess, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1349, 1351 (2004) (describing the
pervasive pressure to accept pleas exercised by judges on defendants).

7.

See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

8.

See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).

g.

See id. at 748-49 n.6.

10.

See id. at 752. Other sources suggest that during the 1960s, plea bargains resolved about
ninety percent of the nation's criminal cases. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where
It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 8o WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1 & n.2
(2002). For a review of the political and systemic pressures that led to the prevalence of plea
bargaining and the Brady decision, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its
History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1979); and Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice:
Plea-Bargaining'sInnocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 79-82.

1i.

See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).

12.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
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part[s]" of the criminal process that led to "prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases.""
Once it legitimized plea bargains, the Court attached heavy weight to the
viability of the plea bargaining system when it considered questions of
constitutional criminal procedure.14 After all, "[i]f every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would
need to multiply by many times the number ofjudges and court facilities.""
Fifty years after Gideon, nearly ninety-five percent of all criminal
convictions are the result of guilty pleas,'" and the Supreme Court has a
substantial commitment to constitutional rulemaking that upholds the primacy
of the plea bargaining system. 7 Plea bargaining "is not some adjunct to the
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."" Not surprisingly,
then, the Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence reflects a fear that
adversarial procedures must be restrained, or "our long and expensive process
of criminal trial could not sustain the burden imposed on it, and our system of
criminal justice would grind to a halt." 9 In this jurisprudence, the Court treats

13.

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.

is.

See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977).
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.

16.

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).

17.

See Nancy Jean King, PricelessProcess: NonnegotiableFeaturesof CriminalLitigation, 47 UCLA
L. REv. 113, 122-23 (1999) (arguing that the "due process revolution . . . put considerable
pressure on the Supreme Court to constrain the scope of rights ... thus providing a partial
explanation for the Court's ... endorsement in the 19705 of plea bargaining itself"); see also
Montr D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the "Untried Conviction"Impeachment Rule,
69 MD. L. REv. 501, 516 (2010) (arguing that "there is, as a general matter, a decided policy
in both United States Supreme Court jurisprudence and the evidentiary rules
of promoting plea bargaining").

18.

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargainingas Contract, 1o1 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). This does not mean that the Court
is indifferent to the substantive rights of defendants entering into plea bargains; the Court's
decisions in cases like Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), and Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
are ample evidence to the contrary.

19.

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In United States v. Ruiz,
the Court considered whether the government had a "constitutional obligation to provide
impeachment information during plea bargaining." 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002). Ruiz called for
the Court to answer constitutional procedure questions about due process and the knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary entry of a guilty plea. However, the Court expanded its inquiry to
consider whether the constitutional disclosure rule urged by Ruiz "could seriously interfere
with . . . securing . . . guilty pleas that . . . help to secure the efficient administration of
justice." Id. at 631. The Court balked at endorsing a rule that might "require the
Government to devote substantially more resources to trial preparation prior to plea
bargaining," or "abandon its heavy reliance upon plea bargaining in a vast number- 90% or
more-of federal criminal cases." Id. In the end, the Ruiz Court concluded that "the

14.
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the plea bargaining system as a quiet "party-in-interest" to the litigation. Even
as to the Great Writ of habeas corpus, the Court's emphasis on finality over
fairness in habeas rulings reflects its concerns that, absent a prioritization of
finality, the plea bargaining system would be unsustainable.2
B. The Court'sEfforts To Regulate Defendant-DrivenAdversariness at Trial
The Court's anxiety about adversariness is not limited to shoring up the
viability of the plea bargaining system. Rather, this anxiety extends to
adversarial constitutional criminal procedures in the trial process itself." It is
my contention that one of the Court's primary means of regulating trial
adversariness has been to reduce defendant control over the invocation of Sixth
Amendment adversarial procedures such as confrontation, compulsory process,
and the right to testify."
The Court believes (correctly perhaps) that allowing defendants to control
the exercise of their Sixth Amendment rights will increase the degree of
adversariness at trial." Perhaps, like many of us who have been public
defenders, the Court suspects that, if they were truly were captains of their own
Constitution's due process requirement" did not demand "radical" changes to the plea
bargaining processes "in order to achieve [a] comparatively small constitutional benefit." Id.
at 624 (emphasis added). For another example, see the discussion of United States v. Hyde,
520 U.S. 670 (1997), in Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and
the Railroadingof CriminalDefendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 863, 899 (2004), which describes
Hyde as "emblematic of a lamentable plea process designed to further judicial economy at
the expense of individual due process" and dependent upon "defendant ignorance about the
realities of the plea process . .. to maintain its vibrancy."
20.

See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); accord Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985) ("Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of
our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and
impairs the orderly administration of justice." (citations omitted)).

21.

For an excellent discussion of how this anxiety about adversariness leads the Court to
narrow the scope of Sixth Amendment protections in order to mitigate their financial and
logistical impacts, see Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 487, 490 (2009).

22.

The Court has also steadfastly refused to require prophylactic rules requiring either that a
trial court advise a defendant about his Sixth Amendment rights or that the court ascertain
that counsel has the defendant's consent to certain conduct. According to the Court, these
procedures would be poor uses of judicial resources and might provoke disputes between
counsel and courts, or prompt counsel to engage in Sixth Amendment contests that they
might otherwise have waived. For discussions of the competing rationales for defendant
autonomy and lawyer control, see Erica J. Hashimoto, ResurrectingAutonomy: The Criminal
Defendant's Right To Controlthe Case, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1147 (2010); and Robert E. Toone, The
Incoherence ofDefendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621 (2005).

23.

For evidence that the Court believes that defendant control will increase adversariness, see
infra notes 82-84.
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ships, defendants would insist upon more adversary procedures than do their
lawyers.' Perhaps this belief reflects, in part, the high volume of ineffective
assistance of counsel cases that come to the Court on a defendant's complaint
about counsel's relinquishment of certain adversarial processes. Or, perhaps
the Court recognizes that in a system dominated by institutional defenders,
defendants fear that lawyers will "conserve" their adversariness and therefore
advocate vigorously for scarce adversarial resources to be spent on their own
cases.
The Court has cabined defendants' vigorous exercise of their adjudicatory
rights by shifting control of Sixth Amendment rights from the accused to
defense counsel. 5 The Court accomplishes this through both direct and
indirect regulation of defendants' rights.
As a preliminary regulatory mechanism, the Court divides criminal
procedure rights into two categories: some rights are fundamental; others are
tactical or nonfundamental.2 6 Fundamental criminal procedure rights are rights
so personal to the accused that only the accused can waive them.2 7 Accordingly,
a defendant has ultimate authority to exercise his fundamental rights; the
defendant alone can decide "whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his
or her own behalf, or take an appeal."" A valid waiver of one of these
fundamental rights requires the defendant's "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." 2 9 Counsel cannot waive a
defendant's fundamental right unless counsel "both consult[ed] with the

24.

"Every experienced advocate can recall the disconcerting experience of trying to conduct the
examination of a witness or follow opposing arguments or the judge's charge while the
client 'plucks at the attorney's sleeve' offering gratuitous suggestions." ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION

§ 4-5.2 cmt. ( 3d ed. 1993), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications
[hereinafter
/criminal justice-standards/prosecution-defensefunction.authcheckdam.pdf
ABA STANDARDS]. I note but lack the space to comment further upon the patronizing and
dismissive way in which the ABA comment describes the defendant who seeks to assist
counsel in a proceeding that puts the defendant-and the defendant alone-at risk of
incarceration, or even death.
25.

Reliance upon Gideon to cabin adversariness has affected indigent and nonindigent
defendants alike. This is because the right to effective assistance of counsel is applied
without regard to whether counsel was appointed or retained. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 344-45 (198o).

26. See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 251-53 (2008).
27.

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000).

28.

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983)). Some commentators suggest that the Supreme Court has also ceded to a defendant
the exclusive authority to waive the right to be present at trial. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§

11.6(a) ( 3 d

ed.

2000).

29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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defendant and obtain[ed] consent" to the planned course of action.3" When the
validity of a waiver is in doubt, the Court requires that judges "'indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights
and ... 'not presume [a defendant's] acquiescence in the loss of fundamental

rights.'

3

In contrast, tactical or nonfundamental rights are strategic rights that can
be waived by counsel without consultation with the defendant." Counsel
controls the exercise of these "tactical" constitutional rights, such as the right to
confrontation" and the right to compulsory process.# Counsel also controls
decisions such as which appellate claims to advance," which trial objections to
invoke or waive,3 6 whether to waive statutory speedy trial rights,37 and
whether, in the federal system, to demand that an Article III judge conduct jury
selection.38 Thus at the trial level, the Court directly regulates defendant-driven
adversariness by allocating control of Sixth Amendment "tactical" rights, such
as compulsory process and confrontation, to counsel.
In addition to directly regulating defendants' invocation of adversary Sixth
Amendment procedures, the Court also indirectly regulates defendants' rights

30.

Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187.

31.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307

32.

33.

(1937)).
See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 257 (2008) (Scalia, J. concurring); Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 n.18 (1988); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965);
Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F. 3 d 39, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Gonzales, 342 F.
App'x 446, 447-48 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Cooper 24.3 F. 3 d 411, 41718 ( 7 th Cir. 2001); United States v. Plitman, 194 F. 3d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1999); Hawkins v.
Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154-56 (ioth Cir. 1999); cf Clemmons v. Delo, 12 4 F. 3d 944, 95556 (8th Cir. 1997) (describing limited exceptions to the constitutional guarantee when
waived or in the case of child abuse), Carter v. Sowders, 5 F. 3 d 975, 981 (6th Cir. 1993)
(requiring consent by the defendant to waive the right); United States v. Stephens, 609
F.2d 230, 232-33 ( 5 th Cir. 1980) (holding that the right to confrontation might be waived by
counsel if the defendant does not object and if it is found to be a "legitimate trial tactic").
For an in-depth consideration of a defendant's interest in controlling confrontation, see
Pamela R. Metzger, ConfrontationControl, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 83 (2012).

34.

Taylor, 484 U.S. at 404; Chappee v. Vose, 843 F.2d 25, 27-33 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987); Eaton v. United States, 437 F.2d 362, 363 (9th
Cir. 1971). For an excellent overview of the adversarial significance of the accused's right to
compulsory process, see Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process, 2002 WIs. L. REv. 1275.

35.

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751.

36.

See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 451.

37.

See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118 (2008).

38.

See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008).
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through application of the Strickland rule. Strickland holds that a criminal
defendant receives constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel when the
defendant can show that (i) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2)
counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defendant. 39 Under Strickland, counsel's
performance was deficient only if it "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." 4 Moreover, reviewing courts must presume that defense
counsel provided adequate assistance "in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment." 1 Thus counsel's strategic choices about the exercise of a
defendant's rights are "virtually unchallengeable."4 Strickland prejudice arises
only if counsel's deficient performance gives rise to a "reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.
Strickland pays lip service to counsel's role "as assistant to the defendant,"
but Strickland's holding gives the lie to that promise. Whether counsel
complies with her "particular duties to consult with the defendant on
important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments" is irrelevant if counsel's failure to consult does not prejudice the
outcome of the case.44 Accordingly, "Strickland grants defense lawyers almost
unlimited freedom of action in managing a case and assures them that their
actions will be deemed professionally adequate as long as such acts can
reasonably be considered to be consistent with sound trial strategy."4 5

39.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 687 (1984).

40.

Id at 688.

41.

Id. at 690.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 694.

44.

Id. at 688. But see Justice Brennan's dissent in Jones v. Barnes, arguing that counsel should
assist the defendant in making choices rather than dictate the "best" choices for the
defendant: "The role of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument
and defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process." 463
U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, while Justice Brennan conceded
that time constraints might require giving lawyers control over "the hundreds of decisions
that must be made quickly in the course of a trial," there is no similar justification for granting
a lawyer control over decisions that can easily be made pretrial such as noticing alibi
witnesses and demanding the testimony of forensic witnesses. Id. at 760 (emphasis added).

45. Rodney J.

Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision To Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal

Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 789 (2000). Uphoff also concludes that
state courts similarly favor counsel control because, among other reasons, they believe that
"granting criminal defendants greater control over strategic decisions [may threaten] the
orderly, efficient administration of the courts." Id. at 791. North Carolina is a notable
exception inasmuch as the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that if counsel and client
are at an "absolute impasse" about a tactical decision, the client's choice controls. See State v.
Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1991).
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The Court applies Strickland to claims of counsel's interference with a
defendant's both fundamental and nonfundamental rights. The Court thereby
indirectly regulates defendant-driven adversariness over fundamental rights by
minimizing any possibility of reversal based upon interference with the
defendant's exercise of that right.
II. DIRECT REGULATION OF DEFENDANT

ADVERSARINESS OVER THE

SIXTH AMENDMENT

Gideon was part of a "first wave" of judicial commitment to strengthening
the structures of adversarial criminal procedure. As that first wave developed, it
provided defendants with "a broad constitutional right to counsel."*6 However,
the Court has subsequently "placed a great deal of power in the hands of
attorneys [and] bound the [defendant] after the fact to virtually all of counsel's
decisions and derelictions."" The last fifteen years have produced a "second
wave" of judicial commitment to the structures of adversarial criminal
procedure: the Court has issued a series of important decisions strengthening
Sixth Amendment adversarial process rights such as the right to trial by jury,
the right to counsel of choice, and the right to confrontation. However, these
decisions have not signaled a retrenchment of the Court's fear of adversarial
Sixth Amendment process. Rather, as I explain below, these decisions have
been based, in part, on the Court's confidence in the success of its prior
regulation of defendant-driven adversariness. Even as the Court rhetorically
revives Sixth Amendment adversarial mandates, it minimizes the invocation of
those adversarial rights by empowering attorneys - not defendants - to control
them.
A. Direct Regulation: Relying on Counsel To Constrainthe Invocation of
"Tactical" Sixth Amendment Rights
The Court's delegation of control over "tactical" adversarial trial rights is
exemplified by Taylor v. Illinois. In Taylor, defense counsel failed to provide the
prosecution with the statutorily mandated pretrial notice of alibi witnesses.48
After an in camera presentation of the witness testimony, the trial court
concluded that the defendant had timely provided counsel with the names of
the alibi witnesses; however, counsel had "blatantly" violated the discovery

46. Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 26 (1986).
47.

Id.

48.

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,404 (1988).
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rules by not disclosing that information. 49 The court precluded the testimony
of the alibi witnesses.
On appeal, Taylor argued that the preclusion of the alibi witness "visit[ed]
the sins of the lawyer upon his client," and unconstitutionally deprived Taylor
of his right to compulsory process." The Supreme Court rejected that
argument, holding that Taylor could- and should- be held responsible for his
attorney's conduct."
In so doing, the Court invoked the principles of Gideon, claiming that a
failure to hold Taylor responsible for "his lawyer's misconduct [would]
strike[] at the heart of the attorney-client relationship."" This brief nod to
defendant interests, however, scarcely masked the Court's primary concern:
"[t]he adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical decision
required client approval."" Absent such a conclusion, the "trial process would
be a shambles." As a general rule, "the client must accept the consequences of
the lawyer's decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to put certain
witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose the identity of certain
witnesses in advance of trial."" Put another way, "counseled defendants [have
no] right to g[u]ide the hands that guide[] them."56
Over time, the Court has come to rely upon defense counsel's control of
"tactical" adversarial rights as a means of reconciling criminal procedure
entitlements with its desire for a continued efficiency in criminal practice.57 As a
result, the Court has been able to strengthen its rhetorical commitment to
adversarial process without risking a real increase in adversarial procedures.
For example, the Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington

49. Id. at 405.
50.

Id. at 416.

51.

Id. at 418.

52.

Id. at 417.

53.

Id. at 418. The Court was unwilling even to require an inquiry into whether Taylor was
complicit in the discovery violation. According to the Court, it would be "highly
impracticable" to require a court to investigate the "relative responsibilities" of counsel and
client "before applying the sanction of preclusion." Id.

54. Id. at 411.
55. Id. at 415.
56. Berger, supra note 46, at 30.
57.

See Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants
Payfor the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2104 (2003) ("Zealous advocacy, or
what is perceived as overzealous advocacy, is a common target of judges' efforts to regulate
their courtrooms. While judges recognize the importance of zealous advocacy, they realize
too that zeal and efficiency in criminal proceedings are often inversely related. That is, zeal is
a 'cost' of judicial efficiency that judges have an incentive to minimize.").
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established a defendant's right to confront testimonial witnesses, regardless of
the reliability of their statements.5" The Court characterized Crawford as a
corrective measure, designed to honor the mandate of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and to protect the American adversarial system from the
"evil" of the "civil-law mode of criminal procedure."59 Yet the Court's opinions
following Crawford -Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,6 0 Bullcoming v. New
Mexico,6 ' and Williams v. Illinois62-were riddled with judicial anxiety about a
potential avalanche of new adversariness.
For example, in Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered whether forensic
declarations constituted testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation
Clause.6 3 Unsurprisingly, the government argued that the "necessities of trial
and the adversary process"6 warranted a forensic exception to the
Confrontation Clause. While the Court ultimately held that forensic reports
were subject to the Confrontation Clause, much of the Melendez-Diaz opinion
addressed concerns that the ruling would result in an avalanche of forensic
confrontation.6 5 Might defendants force the government to call scientific
witnesses for confrontation and cross-examination?6 6 Might the defense insist
that the prosecution produce its' witnesses, only to later decline to examine
them?6 7 Worse yet, might the defense invoke the right to confrontation and
then receive a "windfall" acquittal if the prosecution were unable to produce its

witness ?68
The salve to these judicial anxieties about adversariness was the Court's
assumption that defense attorneys would rein in the invocation of adversarial
procedure. There would be no marked increased in the appearance of forensic
witnesses, because defense attorneys would make good (i.e., resource-efficient)

58. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004).
59.

Id. at 50.

60. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).

S. Ct. 2705

61.

131

6z.

13 2 S.

Ct.

(2011).

2221 (2012).

63. See 557 U.S. at 307.

64. Id. at 335 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 59, Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 (No. 07-591),
2008 WL 4103864, at *59).
65.

See id. at 312.

66. While much of this hysteria stemmed from a dubious concern about the resource-intensive
risks of a nationwide invocation of the Melendez-Diaz ruling, it was accompanied by a sense
of outrage about the possibility that "[g]uilty defendants will go free, on the most technical
grounds." Id. at 342 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 343.
68. See id.
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decisions that would restrain the practical implications of Melendez-Diaz.6 9
True, the Court offered an obligatory assertion that "[t]he Confrontation
Clause . . . is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.""
However, the Court turned immediately to a discussion about why MelendezDiaz would not mean a significant increase in the confrontation of drug
analysts. First, the Court highlighted the relative scarcity of criminal trials
involving forensic evidence."1 Then, the Court scoffed at the "wildly
unrealistic" notion that "defendant[s] will never stipulate to the nature of the
controlled substance" or "will object to the evidence or otherwise demand the
appearance of the analyst."72
The majority's confidence that Melendez-Diaz would have a minimal effect
on trial adversariness stemmed not from a belief that defendants would want to
relinquish their confrontation rights, but from a belief that defense attorneys
would cabin defendant-driven adversariness. The Melendez-Diaz Court offered
a primer on how counsel's control of confrontation would reduce the
occurrence of the forensic confrontation that it had just mandated. First, the
Court pointed out that most states have notice-and-demand statutes requiring
"the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause
right." 3 Then, the Court underscored the fact that defense attorneys would be
the primary gatekeepers of the Melendez-Diaz rule, preventing otherwise
"obstructionist" defendants from "abusing" the "privilege" of confrontation. 74
Because "it [was] unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony,"
stipulations had been-and would continue to be-the primary procedural
mode for introducing drug evidence. 75
What was the Court's explanation for this phenomenon? Defense attorneys
would be unlikely to "want to antagonize the judge or jury by wasting their
time with the appearance of a witness whose testimony defense counsel does
not intend to rebut in any fashion"; moreover, defense attorneys will not
"believe that their clients' interests (or their own) are furthered by objections to
analysts' reports whose conclusions counsel have no intention of
challenging." 6 In other words, defense counsel will control the degree of

69. Id. at 325-26 (majority opinion).
70.

Id. at 325

r1.

Id.

72.

Id. at 3 25 n.1o.

73.

Id. at 326.

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 328 (emphasis added).

76. Id. at 328 & n.13 (emphasis added). The claim that defense attorneys often act out of selfinterest is neither novel nor inconsistent with adversarial zeal. Self-interest may arise when
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adversariness.
There is no mistaking this judicial reliance upon defense counsel as the
gatekeeper for adversariness. The dissenters observe that "the Court professes a
hope that defense counsel will decline" to confront forensic analysts." They
underscore the conflicts of interest that may arise when "defense attorneys
surrender constitutional rights because the attorneys do not 'want to
antagonize the judge or jury by wasting their time."'7 The dissenters make the
admirable, and somewhat unrealistic, assertion that defense attorneys should
not-and would not-engage in such self-serving behavior. 79 Nevertheless, the
dispute between the majority and the dissent is about whether defense counsel
will fully invoke the adversarial opportunities presented by Melendez-Diaz- not
whether defendants will want that adversarial invocation.8o
defense counsel believes that unnecessary invocation of adversariness will gain the client
nothing and cost counsel-and her clients -something. Studies confirm that
despite the adversarial nature of the court system, the participants learn early on
to work together in order to move cases along efficiently. A certain degree of
cooperation between the various players in the courtroom . .. is considered a key
aspect of professionalism. A defense lawyer who does not learn this lesson early
runs the risk of making life difficult for both herself and her clients.
Etienne, supra note 57, at 2138 (citing JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE
9-11 (1982)).

77.

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 352 (Kennedy,

78.

Id. (quoting id. at 328 (majority opinion)). Of course, the "self-interest" may also be an
allocation of scarce defendant resources across the defender's large client pool. See Kim
Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public
Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2422 (1996).

J.,

dissenting) (emphasis added).

79. But see Etienne, supra note 57, at 2138 n.164 (quoting EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 76, at
27) ("[The] defense attorney who violates routine cooperative norms may be punished by
having to wait until the end of the day to argue his motion; he may be given less time than
he wishes for a lunch break in the middle of a trial; he may be kept beyond usual court
hours for bench conferences.").

So. Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny offer a similar example of
criminal procedure rules that appeared to portend an increase in adversarial Sixth
Amendment process, but have, in fact, had little adversarial impact due, in part, to counsel's
control over the adversarial right. Apprendi vindicated the Sixth Amendment jury trial right
as to all essential elements of a crime and, under certain sentencing schemes, Apprendi
increased the number of essential elements that the prosecution would have to prove to a
jury. Id. Thus Apprendi had significant potential to increase both the number of trials (by
encouraging more defendants to request juries) and the number of elements to be proven at
those trials. In its post-Apprendi opinions, the Court expressed concern about Apprendi's
potential to increase trial adversariness. Writing for the majority in Blakely, Justice Scalia
explained that Apprendi need not impact the amount of adversariness in the criminal justice
system as "nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights." Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004). Even in trial cases, Justice Scalia urged, Apprendi
need not increase the length of a trial or the number of contested issues. If the defendant
consents to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, trials could proceed precisely
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B. The JudicialReliance on Gideon To Justify Direct Regulation of
Defendants'Control over "Tactical" Sixth Amendment Rights
The Constitution does not assign control over Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel or to the accused. Rather, the language of the Sixth Amendment
characterizes the counsel guarantee as the right to the "Assistance of
Counsel." 8 ' Accordingly, the Court has had to justify its decision to divest
defendants of control over "tactical" Sixth Amendment rights.
In Jones v. Barnes, the Court linked the right to appointed counsel to "the
superior ability of trained counsel" to advocate on the defendant's behalf.8 , As
to client autonomy over even the fundamental right to appeal a criminal
conviction, the Court linked the achievement of counsel's purpose with the
divestment of client autonomy. While maintaining the defendant's authority
over whether to file an appeal, the Court restricted the defendant's authority
over the appellate claims to be made. This restriction was justified by the idea
that client control would reduce counsel's effectiveness. Allowing the client "to
decide what issues are to be pressed . . . seriously undermines the ability of
counsel to present the client's case in accord with counsel's professional
evaluation."" More to the point, the Court's general premise was not merely
that counsel would be more proficient than the defendant in identifying the
best issues for appeal, but that the defendant would be more inclined than
counsel to increase the volume of appellate issues. Thus, any obligation for
"appointed counsel ... to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client" is
characterized as a disservice to "vigorous and effective advocacy." 8 4 The goal of
effective and vigorous advocacy for indigent defendants was then converted
into a constraint on the defendant's control over his case.
In 1988, the Taylor Court reiterated the core justifications for attorney
control over nonfundamental rights. Thereafter, it has been clear that a
"criminal defense attorney is obligated to follow his client's wishes only with
as they had before Apprendi, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and Blakely. See
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310. Moreover, "when a defendant pleads guilty," the Constitution
permits "judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the
relevant facts or consents to judicial fact-finding." Id. Thus, "[i]f appropriate waivers are
procured, States may continue to offer judicial fact-finding as a matter of course to all
defendants who plead guilty." Id. In short, Apprendi only meant an increase in adversarial
procedures if the defense declined to stipulate to an element. And courts have repeatedly
held that counsel-and not the defendant-controls the decision whether to stipulate to an
element of the crime charged.
81.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

82.

463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).

83. Id.
84. Id. at 754.
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regard to the fundamental issues that must be personally decided by the
client."5 If the decision is a tactical one-even if it concerns a right clearly
enunciated by the Sixth Amendment-the decision is "left to the sound
judgment of counsel," who "need not consult with the client about the matter
or obtain the client's consent."8 6
Courts routinely justify this "reallocation of rights and duties" as
"necessary to give effect to the constitutional rights granted to criminal
defendants and to insure the effective operation of our adversarial system."8 7 In
other words, Gideon's logic and the need for efficiency both justify the
delegation of control to counsel.
For example, in United States v. Gonzalez, the Court considered whether
counsel or the defendant controlled the right to have an Article III judge select
the trial jury.88 The Court began by observing that

"

[n]umerous choices affecting conduct of the trial, including the
objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance,
depend not only upon what is permissible under the rules of evidence
and procedure but also upon tactical considerations of the moment and
the larger strategic plan for the trial.8
According to the Court, these legal complexities are so intricate and
"mystifying" that it would be "difficult" for counsel to explain them to the
defendant." Indeed, an effort to explain them might prove "futile."' This
account of the defendant's hopeless ignorance of legal matters, and his utter
dependence upon counsel to guide him, is "one of the reasons for the right to
counsel," and thus echoes Gideon's premise. 92
Of course, Gideon never held that the "guiding hand of counsel," should
become the guiding handcuffs of counsel's assistance. Yet the Gonzalez Court
conflates the meaningful assistance of counsel with tactical control by counsel.
Counsel thus controls the proceedings, rather than wasting time on "futile"

8s.

United States v. Chapman, 593 F- 3d 365, 369 ( 4 th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).

86. Id.
87.

Id.

88. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008). The alternative would be a magistrate judge.
89. Id. at 249.
go. Id.
91.

Id. (quoting ABA STANDARDS, supra note 24, § 4-5.2 cmt.) ("Many of the rights of an
accused, including constitutional rights, are such that only trained experts can comprehend
their full significance, and an explanation to any but the most sophisticated client would be

futile.").
92.

Id.
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conversations with the ignorant and mystified defendant.
Here too, efficiency is never far from the Court's mind in allocating
authority over procedural rights. The Gonzalez Court reinforces its
commitment to attorney control as a matter of trial efficiency: "to require in all
instances" that the waiver of rights "be approved by the client could risk
compromising the efficiencies and fairness that the trial process is designed to
promote." 93 Unsurprisingly, the "fairness" aspect of this analysis turns on
counsel's independent right to make decisions for the client. Defendants are
assumed to make poor decisions that, in turn, might produce unfairness. To
minimize the risk of this unfairness, courts must give attorneys full rein over
trial procedures.
Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit's defense of attorney control
over "tactical" Sixth Amendment rights. The court emphasizes defense
counsel's dual roles as "an adviser to a client" and "an officer of the court."9 4
Counsel's "chief reason for being present" at trial is not to assist the defendant
in exercising his Sixth Amendment rights, but "to exercise his professional
judgment to decide tactics." 95 The Eleventh Circuit then equates defendant
control over tactical choices with pro se representation: "When the defendant
is given the last word about how his case will be tried, the defendant becomes
his own trial lawyer."96 And, if the judiciary "add[s] to the list of circumstances
in which a defendant can trump his counsel's decision, the adversarial system
becomes less effective." 97 One may speculate whether the court's concern about
an "effective" system reflects a concern about accuracy or efficiency. However,
there is no possibility that the court is concerned about defendant autonomy or
the exercise of adversarial procedures for their own sake.
Of course, efficiency and "effectiveness" are rhetorically unattractive
reasons for ceding control over constitutional rights. Moreover, Gideon itself
posits both fairness and autonomy values in counsel's appointment.98
Accordingly, courts also rely on what one might call a Gideon-agency theory to

93.

Id.

94. United States v. Burke, 257 F. 3 d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the "officer of the court"
reasoning, some courts have argued that attorney control is necessary to avoid forcing
attorneys to engage in unethical conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Ayesh, 765 F. Supp. 2d
763 (E.D. Va. 2011). However compelling that argument might be when a defendant directs
counsel to act unethically, it cannot explain why counsel should be allowed to disregard a
defendant's lawful request for an adversarial process that may be unwise, but is not
unethical.
95.

Burke, 257 F.3d at 1323.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963)-
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justify counsel's control over a defendant's "tactical" rights. Under this
rationale, when a defendant accepts representation by counsel-whether
appointed or retained-the defendant enters into an agency relationship and is
thus bound by the actions of his agent-attorney.
In articulating the agency rationale for binding criminal defendants to their
attorneys, the Supreme Court cites to the 1962 civil case of Link v. Wabash
Railroad Co.,99 and lower courts have followed suit.100 But comparing Gideonrepresentation to Wabash and true agency is utterly dishonest.
Wabash was the plaintiff in a civil suit, and he retained counsel to represent
him."0' Counsel failed to appear at a pretrial conference on Wabash's claim, and
the court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution.1 2 The Supreme Court
held that it was not "an unjust penalty" to dismiss Wabash's claim because of
his attorney's failure to file.' 3 The Court explained:
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the
action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be
wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in
which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and
is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged
upon the attorney."'

4

Of course, on its facts Wabash is inapposite to representation by appointed
counsel.
Moreover, with cases such as Taylor and Barnes, the Supreme Court has
mandated that a relationship between a criminal defendant and his counsel will
not be a true agency relationship. A criminal defense attorney's obligations as
an agent do not "mirror the obligations of a general agent representing his

99. 370 U.S. 626 (1962); New York

v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000).

100. United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 331 ( 5 th Cir. 1999); Hudson v. Pennsylvania,

No. 07-1685, 2009 WL 137313, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2009). These citations to Wabash
do not distinguish between cases in which the defendant was appointed counsel and cases in
which the defendant retained counsel. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249
(2008). Nor does the Court distinguish between criminal defendants who have a right to
counsel and postconviction litigants who have no such right. See, e.g., Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012), is not inconsistent
with these decisions; Maples held that an indigent habeas petitioner and his counsel had an
agency relationship and that counsel's abandonment of his client terminated the agency.
101.

Wabash, 370 U.S. at 627-29.

102.

Id. at 633.

103.

Id.

104. Id. at 633-34 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).
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principal on civil matters."'"5 Typically an agent is "authorized to act for the
principal in all matters within the scope of the agent's authority."' However,
constitutional criminal procedure limits the scope of the authority of the
criminal defense attorney-agent and the criminal defendant-principal. It limits
the authority of the attorney-agent by requiring that the principal-the
criminal defendant-"make the critical decisions about whether to plead guilty
or go to trial, whether to testify, and whether to appeal."' 0 7 More to the point,
the fundamental rights doctrine restricts the authority of the defendantprincipal in ways utterly foreign to a true agency relationship. In a true agency
relationship, the principal "has the authority to dictate the manner in which his
agent will carry out his duties."'0' For criminal defendants, that is not true; the
Supreme Court has placed "certain tactical decisions solely in the hands" of the
agent- the criminal defense attorney.'*9
Accordingly, a defendant's "expressed disagreement" with counsel's
decision over "tactical" Sixth Amendment rights does not "convert the
[decision about the right] into one that must be decided by the client."""
Rather, "even when the defendant expresse[s] a contrary wish to his lawyer," the
lawyer retains control over the decision."' Indeed, one federal appellate court
has even held that a "trial court overreached its authority and infringed" upon
the attorney-client relationship when the court required defense counsel to
honor the defendant's request to call additional witnesses." 2
This Gideon-agency doctrine works as a hedge against defendant-driven
adversariness. In the Fifth Circuit's words, the criminal justice system relies
upon "representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the
acts of his lawyer-agent,"" 3 and "[o]ne can only imagine the havoc that would

105. United States v. Chapman, 593 F 3 d 365, 370 ( 4 th Cir. 2010).

106.

Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

107.

Chapman, 593 F. 3d at 370.

§

2.02 (2006).

108. Id. (emphasis added). This is true regardless of whether counsel is appointed or retained.

"The attorney is the [defendant's] agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the
litigation." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). "Once a lawyer has undertaken
the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer
is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender program." Polk Cnty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.9
(2d ed. 1980)).
log.

Chapman, 593 F.3d at 369.

no. Id.

m.
n2.

Id. (quoting United States v. Burke, 257 F.3d 1321, 1324 (iith Cir. 2001)).
Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1495 (iith Cir. 1991).

113. United States v. Muhammad, 165 F 3 d 327, 331 ( 5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962)).
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ensue should we allow otherwise."" 4 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit believes
that there is a war to be waged between an army of defendants who want to
direct their counsel's actions and a judiciary that insists upon Gideon-agency.
Defending an attorney's control over the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights,
the Eleventh Circuit proclaimed that "[t]he sound functioning of the
adversarial system" was at stake." 5 That system "is critical to the American
system of criminal justice. We intend to defend it."" 6 The defendant seeking
control over his Sixth Amendment right is the enemy combatant who, if given
control, would wreak destruction upon the adversarial system in which he is
charged. The criminal defendant's invocation of his constitutional rights
threatens the "sound functioning" of the constitutional system that has
bestowed those rights upon him.
Thus Gideon itself has become an essential piece of the structure that seeks
to minimize the invocation of Sixth Amendment adversarial procedures. Gideon
representation has become a defendant's de facto relinquishment of the very
rights his lawyer should protect.
Of course, "the counsel clause . . . say[s] that counsel's job is to 'assist[]'
the accused in making 'his'- the accused's -defense, and it is hard to see how
the accused would still own his defense if some government-imposed agent
took it over against his will."" 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has also held that
the right to counsel implies its negative: a criminal defendant need not accept
the assistance of counsel."' Every defendant has the right to selfrepresentation, even if it is "ultimately to his own detriment."" 9
When announcing the Faretta right to self-representation, the Court
characterized counsel as "an aid to a willing defendant.""' According to Faretta,
the right to counsel "supplements" the adversarial structures associated with
criminal trials."' The defendant owns constitutional entitlements, such as the
right to confrontation or the right to compulsory process. The attorney assists
the defendant in exercising those entitlements. After all, the Sixth Amendment
"speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still
an assistant."'22

114.

Muhammad, 165 F.3d at 331 (emphasis added).

115.

Burke, 257 F. 3 d at 1323.

116.

Id.

117.

AKHmiL REED AMAR, THE BIIL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 114 (1998).

118.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).

ng. Id.

at 834.

no. Id. at 820.
121.

Id.

in. Id.
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Even in Faretta, the Court cautioned that the realities of trial procedure
"may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial
strategy in many areas."" 3 However, the Faretta Court warned that "[t]his
allocation can only be justified ... by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to
accept counsel as his representative.""
Faretta never explained the prerequisites to a "defendant's consent" for
counsel to act as his representative. A straightforward assessment of Faretta
would seem to endorse a client-command view of Sixth Amendment rights,
modified by clients' consent to delegate to their "assistant" attorneys decisions
about trial strategy. However, the Court has consistently refused to endorse
such a defendant-autonomy model of Gideon representation - a model in which
lawyers educate and advise clients but clients ultimately control the defense.
Rather, the Court has firmly adhered to the view that, without any explicit
waiver or consent, a represented defendant controls only his "fundamental"
rights; counsel controls all others. And, if a defendant complains that counsel
was ineffective for failing to follow the defendant-principal's direction about a
"tactical" right, his claim will be reviewed under Strickland's toothless standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel.
1I1. INDIRECTLY REGULATING DEFENDANT-DRIVEN

ADVERSARINESS

BY APPLYING STRICKLAND TO DEPRIVATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS

One might assume Strickland applies only to those nonfundamental rights
that counsel is already empowered to waive on a defendant's behalf. Yet, even
if a right is fundamental and therefore waivable only by the defendant, the
Supreme Court applies Strickland's ineffective assistance analysis to counsel's
interference with that right." 5 Thus, at the appellate level, Strickland indirectly
regulates defendant-driven adversariness about the invocation of rights that are
both fundamental and nonfundamental.
The Court has routinely applied Strickland to cases in which a defendant
claims that counsel interfered with his exercise of a fundamental right.12 When

123.

Id.

124. Id. at 820-21 (emphasis added).
12S. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384

(2012).
126. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding that where counsel fails to file a
notice of appeal, the defendant's claim of error will be evaluated as a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (holding that in such cases,
Stricklandanalysis applies to claims about the entry of guilty pleas).
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confronted with questions about a defendant's objection to counsel's conduct
regarding fundamental rights, the Court has refused to hold that counsel's
defiance of the defendant's wishes constitutes a direct violation of the right in
question, rather than a potential instance of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This is in marked contrast to the standards applied when a court or the
prosecution interferes with the defendant's exercise of a fundamental right. 12 7
Even absent specific Supreme Court precedent, lower courts have applied

Strickland to other fundamental rights, such as the right to testify."' Located in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the right to testify is "fundamental" and
"personal" to a criminal defendant. 129 Accordingly, the defendant-not
counsel - retains exclusive authority to invoke or waive it. The Eleventh Circuit
has explicitly stated that "[a] criminal defendant clearly cannot be compelled to
testify by defense counsel," nor can a "criminal defendant . . . be compelled to
remain silent by defense counsel.""' The defendant alone controls the
fundamental right to testify.
Nevertheless, when counsel prevents a defendant from testifying-as
opposed to merely giving bad advice -appellate courts routinely analyze those
cases as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."' Every federal circuit court
of appeals to consider the issue has held that when counsel deprives a
defendant of the fundamental right to testify, the rights deprivation does not
trigger the harmless-error analysis that would apply if the court had caused the
deprivation. Rather, a defendant can obtain relief only if he can satisfy
Strickland's challenging prejudice prong. Small wonder then that, as of 2012,
"no defendant in any court in the United States has been able to prove
Strickland prejudice on the basis of his counsel [erroneously] advising him not

127.

See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 452-53 (5 th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
court should address a possible violation of the substantive right to testify where the
challenged conduct was by the court or the prosecutor, but should use Strickland analysis
when defense counsel's conduct is at issue).

v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), could be understood as a case asking
whether a defendant has an absolute right to testify, regardless of his attorney's wishes.
Seen in that light, Nix represents a decision to apply Strickland to the right to testify.

128. Arguably, Nix

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Brown v. Artuz, 124 F. 3 d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1997);
Teague v. United States, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Akhil Reed Amar,
America's Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1745-47 (2011).

129. See

130. Teague, 953 F.2d at 1532.
131.

E.g., Bray v. Cason, 375 F. App'x 466, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010); Battle v. Sirmons, 304 F.
App'x 688, 693 (1oth Cir. 2008); United States v. Rashaad, 249 F. App'x 972, 973 (4th Cir.
2007); Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534-35. But see Passos-Paternina v. United States, 201 F. 3 d 428
(1st Cir. 1990) (recognizing a dispute over whether Strickland or the Brecht harmless-error
standard applied, but finding that the defendant would lose under either standard).
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to testify in his own defense at trial." 32 The application of Strickland to a
lawyer's deprivation of a client's fundamental rights accomplishes at the
appellate level what the Gideon-agency rule never could accomplish at the trial
level: the utter elimination of meaningful defendant-driven invocation of
constitutional rights.
IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES
REGULATING DEFENDANT-DRIVEN

OF

ADVERSARINESS

A. Gideon-Agency and Strickland Analysis Skew Behavior by Institutional
Participantsin the CriminalJustice System
1. Skewing the Behavior of Lawyers and ProfessionalWitnesses
Taken together, Gideon-agency and Strickland analysis skew the behaviors
of participants in the adversarial system. Defense lawyers know that they have
unilateral control over tactical rights. And, the application of Strickland to
fundamental rights alerts defense counsel that there will be no judicial
condemnation if they assume unauthorized control of fundamental rights."'
But the negative systemic effects of cabining defendant-driven
adversariness extend far beyond the underregulation of defense counsel's
conduct. The trial and appellate regulation of defendant adversariness sends
powerful signals to prosecutors and law enforcement officers. As I have
observed elsewhere, at the trial level, a reduction in adversarial procedure
means a reduction in the power of trial courts to regulate the extrajudicial
behavior of law enforcement and prosecutors."

132. United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 6o6 (5th Cir. 2012). This was not inevitable. As

recently as the mid-199os, some courts applied the Brecht harmless-error standard to claims
that counsel prevented a defendant from exercising the right to testify. Jordan v. Hargett, 34
F. 3 d 310, 316 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing the agreement among some courts that "the
right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf is a fundamental constitutional right
entirely separate from his right to counsel"). Application of the Strickland standard "ignores
recognition of the right as one personal to the defendant which can never be waived by
counsel, competent or not." Id. Six years later, without acknowledging its reversal of course,
the Fifth Circuit repudiated this holding, ruling that when a defendant alleges counsel
prevented him from testifying, the "appropriate vehicle . . . is a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel." United States v. Brown, 217 F. 3d 247, 258-59 ( 5 th Cir. 2000), vacated
on othergrounds sub nom. Randle v. United States, 531 U.S. 1136 (2001).
133. There are many other reasons why defense counsel may eschew adversarial procedures.

However, my focus here is on how the Supreme Court uses Gideon to limit defendants'
invocation of adversarial procedure.
134. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheatingthe Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REv. 475 (2006).
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In the Confrontation Clause and Apprendi contexts, professional witnesses
already know the slim likelihood that any particular case will go to trial.
Gideon-agency rules help to confirm that, even in those rare cases that do go to
trial, defense attorneys are unlikely to insist upon confronting forensic witness
either to contest forensic reports or to contest essential elements related to the
weight and quantity of controlled substances. This encourages even the most
well-intentioned government actors to relax their quality-control and recordkeeping standards. And the ill-intentioned or malicious government witness
has an increasing sense of invulnerability. If no one ever insists upon crossexamining a forensic witness, why should the witness not cut corners, omit
confirmation tests, or even falsify results? Without an adversarial process, there
is no legal deterrent to careless, sloppy, or manufactured police work.
2.

Skewing JudicialBehavior

Both Gideon-agency and wholesale reliance on Strickland review create
strong incentives for trial courts to oversee less and less of the trial process by
delegating more and more to defense counsel, most of whom are underfunded
and overworked. Together, Gideon-agency and Strickland review offer an
almost bulletproof way for trial judges to avoid the risk of reversal: foist as
many potential judicial errors as possible onto trial counsel.
Judicial rulings are generally subject to harmless-error analysis; attorney
errors are subject to the far less vigorous standard of Strickland. Gideon-agency
rules already mean that defense counsel has responsibility for invoking most
Sixth Amendment rights. Any judicial engagement in that process risks

converting the inquiry from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to one of
judicial error."' Since claims that counsel violated a defendant's fundamental
rights are also analyzed under Strickland, trial courts have little incentive to
educate a defendant about those rights, much less to explain that the defendant
controls those rights. By leaving the matters in counsel's "capable" hands, the
Court shifts the risk of adverse appellate review from the trial court to trial
counsel. This shift simultaneously increases the likelihood that the trial
outcome will survive appellate review: the court shrugs off the harmless-error
risk, and counsel shoulders the extremely small risk of a finding of
ineffectiveness under Strickland. Thus, it is not in a trial judge's best interest to
make an effort to guarantee that a defendant is given due control over

135.

See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 632 F.3d 129, 133 ( 4 th Cir. 20u) (holding that whatever
the proper allocation of authority between counsel and client, it was trial error for the Court
to read a stipulation to the jury once the Court knew that the defendant did not consent to the

stipulation).
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fundamental rights.13 6
This reallocation of judicial interests is not without significance. Once the
inquiry is about the ineffective assistance of counsel rather than about the
deprivation of the right in question, the legal inquiry shifts, as does the burden
of proof. In the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry, the "error" being
assessed is the attorney's performance- that is, the reason why the rights
deprivation occurred. In the harmless-error inquiry, the why of the rights
deprivation is irrelevant; once the rights deprivation occurs, the inquiry focuses
simply on whether the error was harmless. More importantly, in ineffective
assistance analysis, the burden is on the defendant to show a reasonable
probability that but for counsel's unprofessional performance, the outcome of
the case would have been different. 13 7 In contrast, in harmless-error analysis,
the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error did not affect the outcome of the case.
True, "defendants usually lose" on the merits of Sixth Amendment
claims.'38 And "even when defendants win on the merits," they often lose under
the harmless-error standard.13 9 However, "one should not minimize the
shadow these rights cast" through the power of harmless-error review.14 0
Harmless-error review helps to encourage judicial behaviors that protect
defendant rights. When given a way to avoid the "shadow" of harmless error,
judges eagerly take it, by minimizing their engagement in the protection of
defendants' rights and maximizing the accountability of defense counsel.
3. Minimizing the Significance ofAppellate Opinions
Many commentators have already noted Strickland's tendency to
underdevelop appellate law about important issues. 4' Under Strickland, a
defendant must prove both that counsel's performance was deficient and that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant."' However, "even if

136. For a discussion about how judges respond to the risk of reversal, see Evan H. Caminker,
Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-LookingAspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX.
L. REv. 1, 77-78 (1994). For a more extended discussion about judicial consideration of
appellate risks, see Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, JudicialDiscretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
129 (1980).
137. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
138. Stuntz, supranote 2, at 13.
139.

Id.

140.

Id.

141. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinaland PracticalUnderminingof
the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. &MARY BIL RTS. J. 91 (1995)142. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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counsel's behavior manifests a total lack of concern for his client and clearly
falls far below acceptable professional norms, his client's ineffectiveness claim
will fail if she suffered no prejudice from her attorney's behavior."11 4 If a
reviewing court concludes that "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice .. . that course should be
followed."'44 Thus reviewing courts are actively encouraged to avoid making
substantive rulings about the rights violation if a simpler ruling about
prejudice will suffice.
Defaulting to a prejudice analysis makes it less likely that appellate courts
will produce opinions that alert future generations of defense counsel and trial
judges about what effective assistance of counsel requires. Application of the
Strickland standard to defense counsel's management of an adversarial right
means that courts can readily avoid developing this important area of law. For
example, if an appellate court concludes that defendant's failure to testify did
not prejudice the outcome of the case, it need never consider the attorney
performance issues related to the deprivation of the right to testify.
B. Gideon-Agency and Strickland Review ProducePerverse Outcomes
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the regulation of adversariness through Gideon and
Strickland produces equally perverse outcomes. Consider, for example, two
defendants, A and B, who are charged with two separate crimes in two separate
cases. In each case, an alleged eyewitness testifies before the grand jury. In A's
case, shortly before trial, defense counsel stipulates to the admission of the
eyewitness's grand jury testimony. Counsel never consults with A about this
decision, and it is only at trial that A learns he will have no opportunity to
confront or cross-examine the eyewitness.
In B's case, shortly before trial, the eyewitness is murdered. The
prosecution argues that B procured the witness's murder with the express goal
of preventing the witness from testifying at B's trial. B has notice of the
prosecution's position, and the trial court conducts an adversarial hearing on
the prosecution's motion. The court finds in favor of the prosecution and,
under the doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, holds that B has forfeited any
Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of the eyewitness's grand jury
testimony.'45 Each case proceeds to trial. Each defendant is convicted.
Now, consider the perverse outcomes of the Gideon-agency rule. At trial,

143. DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

144.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

145. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
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defendant A, who engaged in no wrongdoing, receives the same level of
confrontation as did B, who procured a witness's unavailability. And, on
appeal, A fares worse than B. When B appeals the use of unconfronted
eyewitness testimony, the issue will be addressed on direct appeal. The
appellate court will review the hearing transcript and consider the validity of
the trial court's finding of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. If the trial court's ruling
was erroneous, then B's conviction will be reversed unless the prosecution can
show that the confrontation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In
contrast, A cannot be heard on direct appeal to complain that counsel deprived
him of the right to confront the eyewitness. Under Gideon-agency, A is
responsible for her attorney's stipulation, even though the attorney never
discussed it with A. On collateral attack, A can only raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on counsel's strategic decision to stipulate. And,
even if counsel's decision was strategically indefensible, A has no remedy
unless A can prove prejudice. Surely Gideon was never meant to produce these
types of perverse results.
CONCLUSION

The most alarming perversities of Gideon-agency and Strickland
fundamental rights review may be yet to come. In a little-noticed concurrence
in Gonzalez v. United States, Justice Scalia urged that the Court abandon the
specious divide between tactical and fundamental rights.46 In its place, Justice
Scalia offered an alarming alternative: "I would therefore adopt the rule that, as
a constitutional matter, all waivable rights (except, of course, the right to
counsel) can be waived by counsel."1 4 7 In a system that places a very high value
on the individual right to confrontation and on the freedom-of-choice
principles articulated in Faretta, the notion of an implied waiver of such depth
and breadth is extraordinary.
When Gideon was decided, the legal community believed deeply that "[t] he
adversary system . . . makes essential and invaluable contributions to the
maintenance of the free society. "1141 Real adversarial challenge -and not just its
possibility-was deemed essential to maintaining the American criminal justice
system:
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our

146. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 254 (Scalia,
147.

J.,

concurring).

Id. at 257.

148. FRANCIS A. ALLEN ET AL., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10-11 (1963).
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system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends
upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official
decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process. The
proper performance of the defense function is thus as vital to the health
of the system as the performance of the prosecuting and adjudicatory

functions. 4 9
Fifty years later, the Supreme Court rhetorically exalts the Sixth
Amendment as the paradigmatic expression of our constitutional criminal
procedure, but routinely rationalizes away the exercise of those Sixth
Amendment rights by the defendants entitled to invoke them. For defendants,
the cost of Gideon has been the loss of control over the rights Gideon was
designed to protect. For our criminal justice system, the cost has been the
erosion of the adversarial system Gideon was designed to protect.

149.

Id. at 9-11.
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